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11 Abstract Selecting the right partner is important for the success of alliances and
12 joint ventures. For international joint ventures (IJVs) from diverse cultures partner
13 selection process can become complicated. Prior studies have investigated the
14 alliances and joint ventures to develop a set of objective criteria for evaluate
15 potential partners. This paper reports the study of IJVs formed by Singapore firms in
16 Peoples Republic of China and India. The intent was to develop a methodology for
17 identifying partner selection criteria in a cross-cultural setting. The findings reveal
18 that the partner selection process follows a different logic in Confucian societies.
19 Trust has been established to be essential for developing enduring co-operative
20 relationships. The paper explores the concept of trust in relation to commitment and
21 control in the context of the Confucian culture. We discover that trust is critical to
22 partner selection cultural differences do not significantly alter the partner selection
23 criteria for Singapore firms. Result support the view that while Chinese may depend
24 on networks for social solidarity, social trust does extends beyond the family and is
25 necessary for harmonious and successful joint ventures.
26 Keywords Internationaljointventures.Singapore.India.China.
27 Confuciansociety.Alliances.Partnerselection.Trust.Commitment
29 Introduction
30 Compelling arguments are made for resorting to partnerships and international joint
31 ventures (IJVs) in emerging economies, which offer tremendous market opportuni-
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32 ties. Khanna and Palepu (1997) argue that in emerging economies markets for
33 capital, labor, and goods and services are often underdeveloped and local firms can
34 be efficient providers of intermediary services. Local firms can contribute value-
35 adding services to the joint venture, which would otherwise be unavailable to the
36 subsidiary of a foreign firm. IJV is thus a most effective entry mechanism (Beamish
37 and Banks 1987). In East Asia, China in particular, joint ventures with local partners
38 have been advocated as being critical to doing business (Tsang 1998). The accepted
39 wisdom is that in order to operate in Asia one has to be plugged into the Chinese
40 business networks (Vanhonacker 1997).
41 In an inter-firm co-operative arrangement trust is essential for developing
42 enduring relationship (Carney 1998; Doney et al. 1998; Reed 2001). In environ-
43 ments, which are complex and uncertain, trust allows firms to reduce transaction
44 costs (Noordewier et al. 1990; Williamson 1985). Trust facilitates long-term
45 relationships between firms and is important for the success of IJVs (Browning et
46 al. 1995; Gulati 1995; Madhok 1995).
47 Chinese societies are culturally distinct (Chen 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Lal 1998;
48 Redding 1995; Weidenbaum and Hughes 1996; Whitley 1992); even the logic for
49 network formation is somewhat different. It has been argued that in Chinese culture
50 there is low predisposition to trust, “there is a strong inclination on the part of the
51 Chinese to trust only people related to them, and conversely to distrust people
52 outside their family and kinship group (Fukuyama 1995, p. 75).” Chinese business
53 communities operate primarily through networks (Kao 1993; Redding (1995).
54 Confucian ethics provide the necessary glue binding Chinese communities not only
55 along cultural, social and economic but also along historical and institutional lines
56 (Chen 1995; Fukuyama 1995; Luo 1998;O h1991). Lal (1998) attributes this co-
57 operative feature of transacting business in Chinese societies to the cosmological
58 beliefs of the Chinese civilization.
59 The business systems, embedded in networks and alliances that have evolved in
60 countries like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea and Singapore, are unique (Hamilton and
61 Biggart 1988). The continued economic growth in People’s Republic of China
62 (henceforth called China) and the emergence of very efficient Chinese production
63 and trading networks (Carney 1998), have prompted many to suggest that the
64 influence of Confucian ethics has ramifications on Chinese business practices Q1 (Hicks
65 and Redding 1983; Redding 2002) and needs to be better understood.
66 If the traditional Chinese business networks were built around family and ethnic
67 links, Singapore has attempted to extend this model of strategic cooperation beyond
68 its borders into the non-Sinic regions. Schein (1996) identifies a number of major
69 development eras in the evolution of Singapore. In 1965 attracting MNCs
70 (multinational corporations) and foreign direct investment was critical to its
71 export-led growth strategy. But after the recession of 1987 the emphasis shifted to
72 building an external wing for the Singapore economy. By 1990 the Corporatist State
73 had taken definitive steps toward forging strong economic linkages with the
74 neighboring countries.
75 This study reports the findings of Singapore joint ventures in China and India.
76 China and India represent two dissimilar cultures, one is Confucian and familial and
77 the other individualistic (Hofstede 1993). Both countries offer large markets, high
78 growth rates and are major destination for foreign direct investments. Singaporeans
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79 are well acquainted with both countries through social, cultural and economic ties
80 over a long period. Ethnic Chinese in Singapore account for over seventy-seven
81 percent of the population and dominate the business sector. Ethnic Indians represent
82 less than ten percent of the population and have limited presence in business.
83 While IJVs account for a significant share of foreign direct investments in Peoples
84 Republic of China (Beamish 1993) the advantages of partnership are not easily
85 obtained. International joint ventures require mutual accommodation on the part of the
86 partners. When access to local knowledge is the driving force, it can be learnt and
87 internalized. In India both Coca Cola and Procter and Gamble used IJV as an entry
88 vehicle, but the partnerships were short lived. Shaw and Meier (1994) found that the
89 first generation MNCs operating in China claimed not to benefit greatly in the way of
90 connections from their IJVs. Studies (Luo 2002) indicate that in China the percentage
91 of investments made through wholly owned subsidiaries has increased in recent years.
92 We investigate the motivation for cooperation, the partner selection process, the
93 structuring of the joint ventures and its implication on the success of the joint
94 ventures. Studies have identified partner selection criteria and it is argued that the
95 success rates of alliances and IJVs would improve if firms could apply systematic
96 and analytical methods for partner selection. Since partner selection criteria are
97 influenced by a number of contingency factors developing a universal set of criteria
98 is not feasible. We develop a relational model which explains how partner selection
99 criteria evolve from firm’s assessment of its internal position and its perceptions of
100 potential partner’s commitment and trust, factors which are considered culture
101 bound. The model outlines an approach firms can use to develop criteria for partner
102 selection.
103 The relational logic is then applied to the data collected. How does the cultural
104 heritage and values that the Singapore Chinese share with their counterparts on the
105 mainland influence the IJV formation process and the subsequent relationship with
106 firms in China? Would one expect Singapore firms to pursue a more cautious
107 approach when forming IJVs in India? This comparative study, of IJVs formed in
108 two dissimilar cultures, contributes to our understanding of influence of culture on
109 IJV formation in East Asia, particularly, in the partner selection. We explore the
110 issue of trust and our data tends to support recent revisionist position that trust in the
111 Chinese society does extend beyond the family (Boisot and Child 1996). The paper
112 is divided into four sections. In the first section we review the literature and develop
113 some propositions. Section two presents the research methodology. Third section
114 presents the findings. Discussion and conclusions are presented in the final section.
115 Relevant literature
116 Varieties of reasons have been forwarded to explain the growth of strategic alliances
117 and international joint ventures. According to the resource dependency view, firms
118 possess asymmetrical abilities, and partnerships allow firms to access or acquire
119 resources that they do not possess. This would include technology, management
120 expertise and other strategic and operational capabilities (Hamel et al. 1989; Hamel
121 1991; Lei and Slocum 1992; Parkhe 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Thompson
122 1967). It is argued that the primary objective of the upsurge in strategic alliances and
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123 IJV activities with competitors or prospective competitors, in the triad (US, Europe
124 and Japan), is acquisition of competencies. The intention of cooperation is to
125 compete, which represents a change in tactics, not competitive goals (Hamel et al.
126 1989, Hamel 1991).
127 Organization learning perspective suggests that firms, especially those in
128 knowledge intensive industries develop alliances and joint ventures to acquire
129 valuable knowledge Q1 (Powell et al. 1996). For example, in US–Japanese alliances
130 research suggests that the Japanese partners were often motivated to form the joint
131 venture with the specific purpose of learning from the partner. In intensely
132 competitive environments, the fact that the productive–technical competencies have
133 become globally dispersed, cooperative strategies become necessary for advancing
134 innovative capabilities (Teece 1992).
135 Since alliances are in-between the hierarchy and the market, transaction cost
136 theory posits that it can also provide cost effective solutions to a firm venturing into
137 new territory (Killing 1983; Kogut 1988). Firms establish foreign facilities in
138 conjunction with a partner rather than license or trade to obtain “transactional
139 advantages” (Williamson 1985; Caves 1982). Beamish and Banks (1987) suggest
140 that IJVs may sometime be an ideal mode of operations in the context of
141 transnational activities.
142 Market power theory posits that to compete successfully firms have to strengthen
143 their marketposition.Strategic alliances arethusformedtoalter thebasisofcompetition
144 (Porter and Fuller 1986). To remain competitive or to eliminate competition firms may
145 enter into strategic alliances and form joint ventures thereby strengthening their market
146 position (Ouchi and Bolton 1988). Collaboration provides an efficient mechanism for
147 firm’s growth, especially in the context of economies of scale, where efficiencies are
148 critical, and yet reduce organizational complexities and avoid the uncertainties and
149 difficulties associated with mergers (Mariti and Smiley 1983).
150 Partner selection
151 While alliances and IJVs are growing, studies suggest that the rate of success of such
152 partnerships is low (Harrigan 1988; Kanter 1988; Lorange and Roos 1991; Parkhe
153 1993; Shaw and Meier 1994). Research on IJVs has also produced mixed findings
154 regarding their performance outcomes (Oslan 1996). Some studies suggest that less
155 than half of all alliances perform satisfactorily (Das and Teng 2000).
156 The decision to internationalize is a difficult and complex, with firm wide
157 implications on management. Partnering further complicates the problem. In an IJV
158 situation, the firm not only has to achieve internal agreement on the motives and
159 purposes, it also has to make an intelligent assessment of the potential partner’s
160 intent and capabilities. Selecting the right partner is, therefore, critical to the
161 establishment of a successful IJV (Arino et al. 1997; Buono 1997; Cavusgil and
162 Evirgin 1997; Geringer 1991; Glaister and Buckley 1997; Harrigan 1985; Killing
163 1983; Luo 2002; Tatoglu 2000).
164 Numerous studies have focused on partner selection process with the assumption
165 that developing a more systematic and analytical process can help firms improve the
166 success rates of IJVs. Partner selection models have been developed in different
167 contexts, such as, purchase relationships (Ellram 1991), supply chain management
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168 (Motwani et al. 1998) and alliance formation (Lambert et al. 1999). The process,
169 however, is not a linear, hierarchical process as some of these models would suggest.
170 Another favored approach is to focus attention on identifying partner selection
171 criteria. Prior studies on partner selection have emphasized the importance of
172 identifying a limited set of criteria, which are quantifiable and can be generalized
173 with the intent of developing an objective approach to evaluating potential partners.
174 Normative models and rule-based expert systems have been proposed (Cavusgil and
175 Evirgin 1997) but there is no evidence of such systems being operationalized.
176 This study is an attempt to investigate how motives, capabilities, management
177 philosophy and cultural values influence partner selection criteria of a firm.
178 Partnerships involve commitment by at least two parties, to invest resources and
179 cooperate in decision making over an extended period of time, with the intention of
180 sharing risks and rewards. The mutuality of interest in achieving a favorable
181 conclusion implies that each partner will enter into negotiations with a clear
182 understanding of his strategic intent, a fair idea of the extend of resources that the
183 firm is willing to invest and some idea of what resources they expect the partner to
184 bring to the IJV. The firms would also have developed some criteria for partner
185 selection, formally or intuitively. Logical relationships as developed and represented
186 diagrammatically in Fig. 1, suggests that the partner selection criteria are derived
187 from four different independent assessments. A brief explanation is in order.
188 1. Theorists agree that accessing complementary competencies is what drives firms to
189 seek partnerships. Internal assessment of its capabilities is the first step in
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190 identifying what the firm needs from the partner. Numerous studies (Tomlinson
191 1970; Adler and Hlavacek 1976; Awadzi 1987;G e r i n g e r1991;G l a i s t e r1996;
192 Cavusgil and Evirgin 1997; Al Khalifa and Peterson 1999) have focused on this
193 issue, and identified partner’sr e s o u r c ep o s i t i o na sa ni mportant criterion for
194 partner selection. Geringer (1991) classifies these criteria as “task-related”
195 factors.
196 2. Firms generally, opt for an IJV because they are in the host country to stay and
197 IJV helps enhance their competitive position. For success partners have to
198 commit to the management of the IJV. Partners develop positions on the extent
199 of their commitment, the nature of the management structure acceptable and the
200 control they would like to exercise in the IJV. The role that a firm will play in
201 managing the IJV and its expectations from the partner will be defined by the
202 relative power position that it is willing to accept. Relative power position of the
203 partners is influenced by partner’s size, corporate culture, management structure,
204 style and managerial capabilities. Prior studies suggest that similarity in size
205 (Adler and Hlavacek 1976; Al Khalifa and Peterson 1999; Daniels 1971),
206 corporate culture (Cavusgil and Evirgin 1997; Geringer 1991; Glaister 1996;
207 Spekman et al. 1998), management style and capabilities (Dacin et al. 1997) are
208 some of the factors that firms consider when evaluating partners. Geringer
209 (1991) in his typology classifies these criteria as “partner-related” criteria and
210 points out that they are relevant only when IJV is formed.
211 3. Is the potential partner willing to honor its commitments in the long-run? In a
212 joint venture resource commitments can be agreed and formalized through
213 contracts, and a control mechanism can be put in place for ensuring compliance.
214 However, institutionalized controls, or organizational structures, which are
215 negotiated, elaborated, reproduced and transformed (Gouldner 1973; Lane and
216 Bachman 1998) are inadequate to ensure compliance. Fox (1974) suggests that
217 trust is a discretionary resource and that there will be a whole series of
218 contingent negotiated trade-offs within reciprocal relations, in which diffused
219 obligations are promised and expected and some specified exchanges and
220 outcomes that are contracted and enforced. From a realistic perspective (Reed
221 2001) trust and control are not two sides of a coin, instead the trade-offs are
222 between commitment and compliance. Commitment can lead to trust and
223 controls may force compliance but the relationships are not linear. In Geringer’s
224 typology commitment is one of the “partner-related” criteria.
225 To assess the commitment of potential partner to a conceptual entity is
226 difficult and in the final analysis is based on perceptions and expectations. The
227 public posture of the potential partner may be far different from its strategic
228 intent. A priori, one can assess the potential partner’s commitment and reliability
229 on the basis of past association (Awadzi 1987; Tomlinson 1970). Reputation
230 (Tomlinson and Thomson 1977), relatedness of partner’s businesses (Awadzi
231 1987) are other ways of assessing commitment.
232 4. Finally, there is the question of firm’s motivation. Alliances and IJVs are formed
233 for a variety of purposes. Motivation or strategic intent has an overarching
234 influence on IJV formation (Gibbons et al. 1994). It sets the goals and provides
235 a framework to guide managers involved in IJV formation and negotiations.
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236 Strategic intent is also a statement of top management’s commitment to the IJV.
237 Firm’s motivation to form an IJVallows managers to assign importance weights
238 to the partner selection criteria and helps in ranking the criteria. For example, if
239 the motive is to enhance firm’s market power in the host country and the
240 partner’s distribution system is critical it will be reflected in the criteria’s
241 importance weight. And if the strategic intent is to form an IJV with a limited
242 purpose of gaining partner’s knowledge of the local market then the rankings of
243 the criteria would change accordingly.
245 The context
246 Prior studies have focused on IJVs between firms in two countries. Study of the IJV
247 formation process in three different countries allows grounding of some variables
248 and simplifies situation for sense making. Singapore provides an ideal setting for
249 cross-cultural studies in strategic alliances and IJVs. Singapore government’s
250 regionalization strategy is based on cooperation and networking and aims to help
251 local firms extend their operations by partnering with business in the region. It
252 argued that instead of being threatened by the new competition firms could
253 experience tremendous growth rates by interlocking activities with the emerging
254 opportunities (Singapore Economic Development Board 1993).
255 China and India are both emerging economies that offer not only large markets but
256 are also better endowed with raw materials, technological and human resources. While
257 Singapore has achieved the status of a developed economy its firms are not global
258 players and manufacturing in Singapore is still dominated by MNCs. Economic
259 development is associated with modernization and technological superiority. Past
260 studies on IJVs between developed and emerging economies suggest that market
261 access is a dominant motive for firms from developed economies.
262 Hypothesis 1A
263 Singapore firms will form IJVs in China and India to access the host country
264 markets and not for enhancing the firm’s managerial or technological
265 capabilities.
267 Hypothesis 1B
268 No significant difference is expected between Singapore firm’s motivation to
269 form IJV in India and its motivation to form IJV in China.
270 In Geringer’s typology “task-related” criteria are derived from firm’s capability
271 assessment and its need for acquiring complementary assets. These criteria would be
272 neutral to host country culture. However, task-related criteria, as discussed, would be
273 influenced by strategic intent or motivation. If the motivating factors for forming
274 IJVs in China and India are similar, as hypothesized, then it is expected that the
275 differences in “task-related” criteria will be insignificant.
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276 Hypothesis 2
277 If factors motivating IJV formation in India and China are similar then the
importance assigned to “task-related” criteria will not differ significantly. 279
281 Chinese culture and its influence on partner selection
282 Some characteristics of the partner are easy to ascertain. Firm size, reputation,
283 structure and managerial culture, are relatively easy to figure out, indirectly from
284 prior knowledge, consultants, suppliers, buyers, competitors and other public
285 sources, and directly by seeking such information from the potential partner. Prior
286 studies, suggest that factors, such as, relative size and cultural similarity influence
287 the management structure and systems of the IJVs and hence their success. Geringer
288 classifies them as “partner-related” criteria.
289 Chinese in the Confucian tradition place great importance on a person’s place in
290 social hierarchy (Hofstede 1993). Those outside the Chinese cultures, such as a
291 prospective foreign joint venture partner, who do not fit in the hierarchy would find
292 it difficult to become a part of the network (Volery and Mensik 1997; Yeung and
293 Tung 1996). The mode of association is based on family and ethnic ties. For those
294 outside the family entry into the business relationships or networks would depend
295 on, whether there is a “connection” (gaunxi) between the outsider and a member of
296 the family or someone with whom the family has “guanxi”. It is crucial in business
297 dealings (Swanz 1995). Given the Singapore firms in our sample have ethnic ties
298 with people in China firms will place greater importance to “task-related” criteria. In
299 India on the other hand, the cultural distance would imply that Singapore firms pay
300 greater attention to “partner-related” criteria.
301 Hypothesis 3
302 Because of cultural proximity to China, Singapore firms will assign lower
303 relative importance to “partner-related” criteria when assessing IJV partners in
304 China as compared India.
305 It is argued that culture influences trust building process. Hence cultural similarity
306 will result in convergence, facilitate mutual understanding and reduce conflicts
307 (Doney et al. 1998; Doz 1988). Johnson and Cullen (1996) found that while trust
308 begets trust, how trust is reciprocated was culture dependent. In their study of
309 Japanese and US alliances they discovered that among the Japanese there was a
310 pressure to seek a win–win situation (Axelrod 1984) and if the Japanese perceived
311 violation of trust, the cycle quickly turned into distrust (Brown et al. 1989).
312 Prior studies have cited cultural differences as a reason for the failure of IJVs.
313 Cultural proximity on the other hand is conducive to the adoption of similar
314 communication patterns, cultural beliefs and decision-making styles (Chen and
315 Boggs 1998). These similarities can increase mutual understanding between joint
316 venture partners and reduce communication barriers and management conflicts.
317 When conflicts do arise, cultural similarity makes it easier for firms and their
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318 partners to understand each other and to resolve differences. Conflict leads to social
319 and economic costs and reduce the level of partner commitment (Cullen et al. 1995).
320 Alliances in the Confucian societies are thus expected to be more enduring.
321 Hypothesis 4
322 Since Singapore firms, share a common Confucian culture with firms in China
323 the conflicts encountered in IJV management will be low as compared to
324 conflicts encountered when dealing with partners in India.
325 Conflicts can be managed either by right selection of partners or through controls.
326 Numerous studies have examined the relationship between conflicts, control Q1 (Cullen
327 et al. 1994; Gulati et al. 1994; Mohr and Spekman 1994; Lane and Beamish 1990;
328 Kogut 1988), ownership (Pan 1996) and IJV success. Control refers to the decisional
329 power of a partner and can be affected through various mechanisms of which equity
330 ownership is one (Stopford and Wells 1972; Franko 1971; Gomes-Casseres 1989).
331 The other approach is to incorporate control features into the joint venture contract
332 and the joint venture operating structure.
333 Firms focus on control in a joint venture to counteract any opportunistic behavior.
334 When both firms are intent on learning from each other, the firm that is lagging
335 behind in knowledge will gain disproportionately more. The asymmetrical pattern of
336 pay-off can lead to situation, analogous to prisoner's dilemma, where there is
337 incentive to shirk or cheat, and pursue individual interests at the expense of the other
338 (Buckley and Casson 1988; Parkhe 1993; Williamson 1985). When the positional
339 payoffs Q1 (Tucker 1991) favor one partner and the principle of strict reciprocity breaks
340 down firms may put in place elaborate systems of controls. Appropriate design of
341 control mechanisms is important for the success of an IJV.
342 There are many schools of thought on this issue, some advocating dominant
343 control to be vested in the foreign partner (Harrigan 1985; Gugler 1992) while others
344 argue for balanced control (Eiteman 1990; Lane and Beamish 1990; Bleeke and
345 Ernst 1991). Proponents of dominant control suggest that this approach prevents
346 opportunistic behavior of partner(s), ensures that the joint venture is managed in one
347 style, and minimizes or resolves conflicts efficiently. Control, however, implies lack
348 of trust and counters transactional benefits that may accrue due to the alliance.
349 Cultural influences on control have been widely studied (Tse et al. 1997; Kogut and
350 Singh 1988). Tse et al. found that partners from a high power distance culture preferred
351 equity joint ventures as an entry mode. The need for control is also greater when the
352 parties encounter cultural differences and are not familiar with each other. Other studies
353 suggest that as cultural differences increase, the investment in non-deployable assets
354 becomes riskier (Kogut and Singh 1988) and foreign firms may prefer less equity
355 involvement. Bleeke and Ernst (1991) found that joint ventures with an even split of
356 ownership are more likely to succeed as opposed to those in which one partner holds a
357 majority equity stake. Prior results are inconclusive. We would, however argue that a
358 firm’s equity investment in an IJV would be influenced by its motivation (strategic
359 intent). Considering that the government in Singapore has been encouraging the
360 domestic firms to regionalize through IJVs it is expected that Singapore firms would
361 be looking at the long term perspective when investing in the IJVs.
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362 Hypothesis 5
363 Since Singapore firms share the Confucian culture with Chinese firms they
364 would place less importance on dominant control when forming IJVs in China
365 as compared to India.
367 Hypothesis 6
368 Singapore firms will seek majority equity stake in its IJVs in China and India.
371 Research methodology
372 This study focused on the Singapore partners in the IJVs formed by Singapore firms in
373 China and India. The research population and sample consisted of Singapore-owned
374 firms known to the Singapore Trade Development Board (STDB) to have joint ventures
375 in China and India. However, the population identified is not comprehensive because
376 there is no compulsory registration of overseas investment by Singapore firms.
377 “Singapore-owned firms” are defined as firms, which are at least 51% owned by
378 Singaporeans. Questionnaires were mailed to 295 Singapore firms who had IJVs in
379 China and 80 Singapore firms who had IJVs in India. Covering letters requested that
380 they return the questionnaires within a month in the enclosed business reply envelopes
381 and a letter from the STDB, a partner in this research, was enclosed. Responses were
382 received from 64 firms with joint ventures in China and 35 Singapore firms with joint
383 ventures in India, which amounted to a response rate of approximately 20.34% (China
384 sample) and 43.75% (India sample). Out of these responses, ten (China sample) and
385 seven (India sample) had to be discarded as being unsuitable or incomplete.
386 The research instrument used relevant existing instruments with minor amend-
387 ments being made to the scales whilst maintaining construct equivalence. A
388 questionnaire developed by Demirbag et al. (1995) was used to measure reasons for
389 venturing into China and India. For measuring motivation for forming the joint
390 ventures the questionnaire developed by Hung (1994) was used. The list of criteria
391 for partner selection was adopted from Geringer (1991) questionnaire. Multiple-item
392 constructs were developed to measure conflict management and control. The
393 measure for conflict was based on Habib’s( 1987) scale assessing conflict among
394 joint venture partners. Habib isolated fourteen conflict issues in the joint venture
395 relationship relating to, for instance, partner's handling of financial matters. This
396 scale was simplified and reduced to eight conflict issues. Control indicates the extent
397 of influence the Singapore partner exercise over decisions. Respondents were asked
398 to comment on the extent of control that they liked to exercise in the IJV. Control is
399 also measured in terms of equity holdings and decision-making authority. Success of
400 the joint venture relationship is measured on a scale of 1 to 5 based on a single
401 construct of perceived satisfaction (Cullen et al. 1995).
402 The questionnaire was translated into Mandarin for use with Chinese-educated
403 respondents who had formed joint ventures in China and back translated, for content
404 validity. Both the English and Chinese versions of the questionnaire were pre-tested;
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405 minor changes to the questionnaire format resulted. General questions relating to the
406 Singapore parent, the joint venture and the Chinese partner, such as core business
407 and annual turnover in Singapore dollar, were included in the questionnaire so as to
408 capture the profile of the Singapore firms investing in China and India.
409 Findings
410 Even though manufacturing in Singapore is dominated by MNCs the local
411 manufacturing firms form the major group investing in IJVs in China. Singapore
412 firms’ investments in China as well as in India are predominantly in manufacturing,
413 transportation and logistics (Table 1). They are also mostly SMEs. More than two
414 third (72.2%) of the firms in our sample, investing in China, reported turnover
415 volume of less than Singapore $100 million and 42.6% of the firms employed less
416 than 100 employees. The firms investing in India were larger, more than 60% of the
417 surveyed firms reported turnover of more than Singapore$ 100 million and 71.4% of
418 the firms employed more than 100 employees.
419 Emerging markets of India and China have been attracting large inflows of FDI
420 (foreign direct investments). In China a significant share of these inflows were from
421 the countries in Asia and primarily because of the potential size of their markets.
422 Singapore investments in these countries are also primarily market driven. It
423 suggests that Singapore Government’s initiatives and its regionalization drive has
424 had a positive impact on the outflows of FDI.
t1.1 Table 1 Business of joint venture
Industry China (missing=4) India (missing=3) t1.2
Number of
firms
Percentage Ranking Number of
firms
Percentage Ranking t1.3
Metal fabrication and
machinery
13 26.0 1 2 8.0 3 t1.4
Real estate 9 18.0 2 2 8.0 3 t1.5
Others 9 18.0 2 9 36.0 1 t1.6
Transportation, logistics and
warehousing
8 16.0 3 5 20.0 2 t1.7
Construction 3 6.0 4 1 4.0 4 t1.8
Trading 3 6.0 4 0 0 - t1.9
Business/engineering services 2 4.0 5 0 0 - t1.10
Hotels and lodging 2 4.0 5 0 0 - t1.11
Chemicals, petroleum, rubber
and plastics
1 2.0 6 2 8.0 3 t1.12
Food and beverages 0 0 – 2 8.0 3 t1.13
Paper, printing and publishing 0 0 – 1 4.0 4 t1.14
Computer software 0 0 – 1 4.0 4 t1.15
Total 50 100.00 25 100.00 t1.16
t1.17 Miss value=4
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425 Motivation for joint venture formation
426 That Singapore firms would form IJVs with the local partners with the intent of
427 enhancing their market power in the host countries (Hypothesis 1A, 1B) is
428 supported. Findings indicate that, in both countries, IJVs were formed primarily to
429 utilize partner’s knowledge of local market and to gain better access to local markets
430 (Table 2). The position that motivation to form IJVs is a strategic decision driven by
431 financial and competitive considerations and should not be influenced by cultural
432 factors is maintained. Local partners in emergent economies are similarly drawn by
433 their own strategic considerations and often form IJVs with the intent of obtaining
434 access not only to capital but also to technology and export markets. Conflicting
435 strategic intents suggest that Singapore firms should find it problematic to find right
436 partners.
437 Partner selection
438 Studies in the developed countries suggest that in order to reduce uncertainties
439 implicit in the partner selection process, a formal approach is warranted (Mitsuhashi
440 2002). Luo (2002) also suggests a systematic analysis of the prospective alliance
441 partners for the success of the joint ventures in China. But the majority of Singapore
442 firms in our sample stated that they adopted an incremental approach to partner
443 selection and identified partners primarily through their personal contacts and
444 networks in both countries (Table 3). The approach to partner identification will be
445 primarily dependent on how easy it is to obtain reliable information about the
t2.1 Table 2 Motivation for joint venture formation
Motivation China India T test t2.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t2.3
1 Gain better access to local market 2.25 1 1.57 1 −1.588 t2.4
2 Exploit new investment opportunities 2.27 2 2.46 4 0.733 t2.5
3 Meet existing government requirements 2.55 3 2.18 3 −1.398 t2.6
4 Utilize the partner’s knowledge of the local market
and business practices
2.68 4 1.75 2 −2.116 t2.7
5 Utilize the partner’s operational capabilities 2.80 5 3.04 10 0.979 t2.8
6 Utilize the local technical capabilities 2.84 6 3.32 11 1.940 t2.9
7 Obtain preferential treatment by the host government 2.88 7 3.00 8 0.494 t2.10
8 Spread the risk of establishing an enterprise 2.94 8 2.54 6 −1.581 t2.11
9 Develop cultural familiarity 2.98 9 2.54 5 −1.942 t2.12
10 Secure projects from the local authorities 3.02 10 3.57 13 1.807 t2.13
11 Become ‘global’ more quickly 3.10 11 2.96 7 −0.445 t2.14
12 Minimize capital investment 3.16 12 3.00 8 −0.607 t2.15
13 Utilize the partner’s contribution in terms of management
expertise
3.18 13 3.32 11 0.578 t2.16
14 Generate new ideas for our company 3.41 14 3.68 14 1.010 t2.17
15 Acquire the host country technology 3.82 15 4.29 15 2.060 t2.18
t2.19 Significant at 5% level of confidence
1 very important, 5 not important
Int Entrep Manag J
JrnlID 11365_ArtID 76_Proof# 1 - 04/02/2008AUTHOR'S PROOF
UNCORRECTED PROOF
446 potential partner. In the case of large public listed firms, in environments where
447 regulators are demanding, information is easier to obtain than it is in emerging
448 markets and about closely held and family owned SMEs.
449 Partner selection criteria
450 It is argued that selection of “task-related” criteria, derived as they are from firm
451 capabilities and expectations, are influenced by motivation for forming IJVs (Franko
452 1971; Harrigan 1985; Killing 1983). Findings (Table 4) reveal that the rank ordering
453 of “task related” factors for IJVs formed in China and in India are similar and the t
454 tests do not do not demonstrate significant difference. Hence “task-related” criteria
455 are culturally neutral supporting Hypothesis 2. However, we do not find support for
456 Hypothesis 3. As far as “partner-related” criteria are concerned, contrary to what the
457 literature suggests, we found country level differences on some criteria but not all.
458 On factors, such as, corporate culture, national culture, and firm size the rankings as
459 well t-tests showed no significant difference between the two samples.
460 The variable, on which there was significant difference between the two samples,
461 was partner’s ability to use “guanxi” or connections in aid of the IJV. This suggests
462 that the need for “guanxi” is well accepted by Chinese firms. We elaborate on this
463 point later in discussion section. The other variables, which registered significant
464 differences, were (a) the possession of licenses, (b) favorable location, and (c) the
465 venture’s ability to secure projects from the local government.
466 We decided to check the validity of applying Geringer’s typology to our sample.
467 Factor analysis and review the factor loadings produced three rather than two
468 underlining factors (Table 5). Partner’s strong commitment to the IJV and its
469 willingness to use its reputation capital to the advantage of the IJV obtained high
t3.1 Table 3 Partner identification approaches
Partner identification China India T test t3.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t3.3
1 Personal contact 2.29 1 1.89 1 −1.844 t3.4
2 Referral by business associates 2.35 2 2.07 2 −1.366 t3.5
3 Prior work contact 2.35 3 2.33 3 −0.077 t3.6
7 Business associates with prior working relationship 2.45 4 2.37 4 −0.377 t3.7
10 Joining business mission organized by government
organizations such as the Trade Development Board and
Economic Development Board
3.00 5 3.59 6 2.214 t3.8
11 Joining business mission organized by business organizations
such as the Singapore International Chamber of Commerce
3.08 6 3.52 5 1.705 t3.9
4 Trade and investment fair held in Singapore 3.59 7 3.74 8 0.688 t3.10
8 Engaging consulting firm to conduct an extensive search 3.80 8 3.73 7 −0.350 t3.11
9 Business directories published by host government authorities 4.06 9 3.93 9 −0.621 t3.12
5 Cold calls from the local company who are looking for
investors
4.10 10 4.11 11 0.048 t3.13
6 Cold calls from middle man 4.14 11 4.07 10 −0.278 t3.14
t3.15 Confidence interval=95%
1 strongly agree, 5 strongly disagree
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470 ranking which suggests that firms value “trustworthiness” when deciding on who to
471 partner with. This is a matter of perception and fits in with our conceptualization as
472 presented in Fig. 1. Thus in their search for partners in China, there is a need to
473 ascertain that the firm in question possesses “guanxi” and that the connection would
474 be to the benefit of the IJV. In the context of Confucian societies, this concept of
475 “guanxi” is more than just connections; it is “friendship with implications of
476 continued exchange of favors” (Tsang 1998, p. 65). Commitment to the IJV and the
477 willingness to use its “guanxi” for the benefit of the JV thus implies acceptance in
478 the network. Geringer’s classification, which has been widely used by researchers, it
479 would appear has limitations when applied to East-Asian context and needs revision.
480 Finding a trustworthy partner with compatible objectives was also rated as the
481 most problematic issue in IJV formation (Table 6). The results are contrary to
482 expectations. Singapore firms claimed that they had found it more difficult to find a
483 trustworthy partner in China than in India. The expectation that cultural similarities
484 would cement ties, build trust and make it easier to for, IJVs does not appear to hold
485 true in our study. Findings (Table 6) suggest that Singapore firms find it harder to
486 negotiate with Chinese than they do with the counterparts in India. It may be argued
487 that institutional systems, a well developed legal system which Singapore shares in
488 common with India, is a source of trust.
t4.1 Table 4 Partner selection criteria
Partner selection criteria China India T test t4.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t4.3
2 Helps comply with government requirements/pressure 1.87 1 2.11 2 1.084 t4.4
22 Has the ability to make use of “guanxi” to secure business 1.94 2 2.59 7 3.053 t4.5
16 Seems to have a strong commitment to the venture 2.08 3 1.85 1 –0.995 t4.6
8 Has access to marketing or distribution systems 2.13 4 2.27 4 0.519 t4.7
13 Understands the business 2.17 5 2.41 5 0.970 t4.8
6 Possesses needed licenses, patents, know-how, etc. 2.20 6 2.93 14 2.392 t4.9
7 Controls favorable location (e.g. for manufacturing) 2.27 7 2.97 15 2.374 t4.10
12 Will enable the venture to produce at lowest cost 2.36 8 2.88 12 1.749 t4.11
14 Is in the same core business 2.38 9 2.88 12 1.745 t4.12
20 Has had satisfactory prior association with our firm 2.38 9 2.81 9 1.507 t4.13
15 Enhances venture’s ability to secure projects from the
local government
2.45 10 3.14 18 2.529 t4.14
1 Enables venture to qualify for subsidies or credits 2.48 11 3.00 16 1.991 t4.15
3 Will provide financing/capital to venture 2.51 12 2.89 13 1.469 t4.16
10 Has valuable trademark or reputation 2.57 13 2.85 10 0.929 t4.17
11 Enhances perceived local or national identity 2.60 14 2.46 6 –0.513 t4.18
9 Has access to post-sales service network 2.62 15 2.88 11 0.923 t4.19
17 Possesses management style that are compatible with ours 2.63 16 2.25 3 –1.804 t4.20
4 Can supply technically-skilled personnel 2.81 17 2.74 8 –0.306 t4.21
21 Has similar corporate culture 2.87 18 3.23 19 1.590 t4.22
18 Has similar national culture 2.92 19 3.33 20 1.826 t4.23
5 Can supply general managers to the venture 3.33 20 3.04 17 –1.210 t4.24
19 Is similar in size 3.35 21 3.58 21 0.936 t4.25
t4.26 Significant at 5% level of confidence
1 very important, 3 moderately important, 5 not important
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489 Management style and control
490 How do Singapore firms deal with the issue of management and control? Firms were
491 asked to state their preferred approach to ensuring a degree of control on their IJV
492 investments. In both samples, firms stated that they preferred dominant control, i.e.,
493 a major say in the strategy formulation and implementation (Table 7). Need for
494 dominant control may imply lack of trust. It has been argued that firms from similar
495 cultures may be willing to share control. Our findings do not support this position
496 since Singapore firms opted for dominant control both in India and in China.
497 Hypothesis 5 is rejected.
498 When asked about their equity investments, more than half (54%) of the
499 respondent firms reported that they have majority equity holding in the IJV
t5.1 Table 5 Rotated factors for partner selection criteria
Partner selection criteria category Rank Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 t5.2
Resource
contribution
Trustworthiness Management
systems t5.3
Enables venture to qualify for subsidies or
credits
14 0.60
a 0.53 –0.01 t5.4
Provide financing/capital to venture 12 0.58
a 0.31 0.15 t5.5
Can supply technically skilled personnel 20 0.69
a 0.05 0.02 t5.6
Can supply general managers to the venture 22 0.67
a 0.04 0.11 t5.7
Possesses needed licence, patents,
know-how, etc.
6 0.70
a 0.23 0.14 t5.8
Controls favourable location 9 0.54
a 0.24 0.32 t5.9
Access to marketing or distribution systems 5 0.52
a 0.36 0.35 t5.10
Access to post-sales service network 17 0.72
a 0.19 0.33 t5.11
Valuable trademark or reputation 15 0.62
a 0.22 0.23 t5.12
Enhances perceived local or national identity 16 0.54
a 0.26 −0.01 t5.13
Enable the venture to produce at lowest cost 10 0.45
a 0.50 0.21 t5.14
Helps comply with government requirements 1 0.39 0.68
a −0.10 t5.15
Understands the business 4 0.10 0.69
a 0.32 t5.16
In the same core business 7 0.19 0.71
a 0.36 t5.17
Enhances venture’s ability to secure projects
from the local government
11 0.26 0.63
a 0.30 t5.18
Seems to have a strong commitment to the
venture
3 0.10 0.70
a 0.23 t5.19
Has had satisfactory prior association with
our firm
8 0.18 0.62
a 0.23 t5.20
Has the ability to make use of guanxi to secure
business
2 0.37 0.46
a 0.20 t5.21
Possesses management style that are compatible
with ours
13 0.08 0.32 0.67
a t5.22
Similar national culture 18 0.17 0.27 0.83
a t5.23
Similar in size or corporate structure 21 0.47 0.04 0.67
a t5.24
Similar in corporate culture 19 0.11 0.29 0.81
a t5.25
Eigenvalue 8.81 1.95 1.41 t5.26
Pct. of var. 40.00 8.90 6.40 t5.27
Cum. pct. 40.00 48.90 55.30 t5.28
t5.29
aFactor loading≥0.50
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500 (Table 8). This finding is consistent with their preference for dominant control
501 (Table 7). It is also in keeping with the findings (Tse et al. 1997) that firms from high
502 power distance societies prefer majority equity holding and dominant control and
503 Hypothesis 6 is supported.
504 Conflicts
505 The respondents were asked to comment on the frequency of conflicts encountered.
506 As shown by the mean values (Table 9) all of the listed conflict types were reported
507 to be less than moderately frequent in occurrence. Partner’s handling of financial
508 matters was rated the most frequently encountered cause of conflict in both samples.
509 Interestingly even though 29% of the IJVs in China were in the manufacturing
510 sector, product related conflicts were ranked as the least of causes of disagreement.
511 Again we see very little difference in the responses in the two samples.
t7.1 Table 7 Singapore firm’s preferred style of management control
Management China (missing=3) India (missing=1) t7.2
Number of firms Percentage Ranking Number of firms Percentage Ranking t7.3
Dominant 32 62.7 1 20 71.43 1 t7.4
Shared 9 17.6 2 3 10.71 3 t7.5
Minority 8 15.7 3 0 0 - t7.6
Independent 2 3.9 4 4 17.86 2 t7.7
Total 51 100.00 27 100.00 t7.8
t6.1 Table 6 Problems encountered in identifying and selecting a partner
Problems China India T-test t6.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t6.3
2 In finding a trustworthy partner 2.04 1 2.69 1 2.101 t6.4
1 In finding a partner with compatible objectives 2.35 2 3.08 4 2.762 t6.5
9 In meeting local government’s legal restrictions on collaborative
agreements
2.55 3 2.72 2 0.662 t6.6
5 In agreeing with partner on how alliance is to be managed 2.58 4 3.24 6 2.885 t6.7
6 In agreeing with partner on how future benefits are to be shared 2.73 5 3.48 10 3.362 t6.8
4 Due to lack of human resources to enter into alliances 2.74 6 3.38 8 2.106 t6.9
10 In agreeing with partner on each party’s contribution to the
alliance
2.75 7 3.36 7 2.648 t6.10
8 Due to differences in corporate culture/organizational structure
hampering formation negotiations
2.83 8 3.12 5 1.286 t6.11
7 Due to differences in personal social/cultural attitudes hampering
formation negotiations
2.98 9 3.00 3 0.083 t6.12
11 In finding a partner with compatible size and bargaining strength 3.06 10 3.40 9 1.361 t6.13
3 Due to lack of funding to search for alliance partners 3.45 11 3.81 11 1.331 t6.14
t6.15 Confidence interval=95%
1 strongly agree, 5 strongly disagree
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512 Success of the IJV
513 The perceived success was measured on a number of dimensions (Table 10). We
514 asked the respondents to comment on the overall satisfaction with IJV and on the
515 average they were indifferent. This was again true for both the samples.
516 Discussion
517 The primary intent of this research was to determine the impact of culture on partner
518 selection in East Asia. Our research focused on the following: (1) establishing how
519 partner selection criteria are derived from the firm’s internal capabilities, its
520 limitations, its expectations from the partner, its perception of potential partner’s
521 trustworthiness and its motivations, (2) how firms select their partners, and (3) the
522 influence of Chinese familial culture on partner selection process, the structure of
523 IJVs, the management of IJVs and the success of IJVs.
524 Finding trustworthy partners
525 Perception of credibility and trust rather than “task-related” factors appear to be the
526 determining factors for partner selection. Trust appears to be central to understanding
t9.1 Table 9 Types of conflicts
Problems China (N=49) India (N=24) T test t9.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t9.3
The partner’s handling of financial matters 3.20 1 3.24 1 0.756 t9.4
The placement of parent company personnel in JV 3.31 2 4.04 8 −2.229 t9.5
The partner’s attempt to control key decisions in the JV 3.41 3 3.44 2 −0.450 t9.6
Expansion strategies and plans in the JV 3.42 4 3.50 3 0.358 t9.7
The partner’s attempt to make changes in the terms of the
JV contract
3.50 5 3.60 4 −0.157 t9.8
The division of benefits between the partners 3.51 6 3.76 6 −0.609 t9.9
Separating the operations of the JV from those
of the parent company
3.67 7 3.80 7 0.337 t9.10
Product proliferation 3.78 8 3.68 5 0.947 t9.11
t9.12 Confidence interval=95%
1 always disagree, 5 never disagree
t8.1 Table 8 Equity level of Singapore parent firm in the joint venture with Indian and Chinese firms
Ownership China (missing=2) India (missing=2) t8.2
Number of firms Percentage Ranking Number of firms Percentage Ranking t8.3
Less than 25% 9 17.0 3 3 11.5 3 t8.4
26%-50% 14 26.7 2 8 30.8 2 t8.5
More than 50% 29 56.3 1 15 57.7 1 t8.6
Total 52 100.00 26 100.00 t8.7
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527 the formation of alliances and IJVs. The multiple definitions of trust offered by
528 scholars can cause confusion (Butler 1991; Hosmer 1995; Reed 2001; Shapiro 1987;
529 Zucker 1986). Lewicki and Bunker (1995) distinguish between three types of trust:
530 calculus-, knowledge-, and identification-based trust. Larzelere and Huston (1980)
531 propose two qualities which define trust: benevolence and honesty. Sitkin (1995)
532 distinguishes between: competency-, benevolence-, and value-based trust. Doney et
533 al. (1998, p. 604) define trust as, “a willingness to rely on another party and take
534 action in circumstances where such action makes one vulnerable to the other party”.
535 Theseconceptualizationsoftrustarebuiltaroundtwofactors,acognitivecomponent,
536 which focuses on the calculative aspect and a behavioral component, which addresses
537 the issue of “benevolence” or “integrity” (Bigley and Pearce 1998; Johnson and Cullen
538 1996; Ganesan 1994). Calculus-based trust implies that trust is a calculated decision to
539 cooperate with specific others, based on information about other’s personal qualities
540 and social constraints (Gambetta 1988). Calculative trust assumes a value-free
541 rationality and would be culturally neutral. The implication that as knowledge
542 increases trust will beget trust (e.g., Blau 1964; Johnson and Cullen 1996;Z a n d1972)
543 has not been evidenced in recent empirical findings (McKnight et al. 1998).
544 Benevolence or integrity is built on the expectation that the exchange partner will
545 not engage in opportunistic behavior, despite short-term incentives and uncertainty
546 about long-term rewards (Bradach and Eccles 1989; Rotter 1967). It is based on
547 shared moral values and norms to support collaboration within uncertain environ-
548 ments (Reed 2001). Game theorists are agreed that reciprocal altruism develops trust
549 and the sociobiologists go a step further to suggest that altruism or empathy is in
550 human genes. Social trust is inherent in communities connected by ethnicity and
t10.1 Table 10 Perceived success of the joint venture
Problems China India T test t10.2
Mean Rank Mean Rank t10.3
1 In general, our relationship with our local partner is satisfactory 2.08 1 2.04 1 −0.177 t10.4
2 All in all, our local partner has been fair with us 2.28 2 2.19 3 −0.427 t10.5
3 Overall, our local partner is a good company with which to
do business
2.42 3 2.12 2 −1.431 t10.6
5 Overall, our local partners’ policies and programs benefit
the alliance
2.51 4 2.38 6 −0.554 t10.7
4 We are satisfied with the performance of our local partner in
the alliance
2.55 5 2.31 4 −1.065 t10.8
6 We will definitely form new alliances with the present partner
in future if there are new ventures that will fit us well
2.64 6 2.35 5 −1.063 t10.9
11 The alliance has shown less growth potential than we hoped
(inversed)
a
2.75 7 2.92 10 0.628 t10.10
8 Overall, we consider the alliance to be successful 2.75 7 2.58 8 −0.677 t10.11
10 The alliance has met our expectation 3.02 8 2.81 9 −0.824 t10.12
9 The alliance output has achieved good market penetration 3.02 8 2.4 7 −2.559 t10.13
13 The alliance has achieved growth goals set for the last 5 years 3.17 9 3.21 11 0.160 t10.14
12 The alliance has achieved profit goals set for the last 5 years 3.24 10 3.25 12 0.022 t10.15
7 The alliance is more profitable than we expected 3.32 11 3.44 13 0.403 t10.16
t10.17 Confidence interval=95%
1 strongly agree, 5 strongly disagree
a1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree
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551 culture. Predisposition to trust cannot be overlooked in the partner selection process.
552 Low predisposition to trust puts up barriers to inter-firm cooperation hence, as
553 Johnson and Cullen (1996) observe, firms in community based cultures, such as
554 Japanese, show greater willingness to engage in trusting relationship.
555 There is always the possibility that one of the partners may resort to
556 opportunism—cheating, shirking, and distorting information, misleading and
557 appropriating partner’s critical resources. Some of these problems can be averted,
558 by developing appropriate control systems. Controls increase transaction costs
559 (Williamson 1985) and they also surface conflicts. Hence, when seeking joint
560 venture partners, firms are likely to partner with firms seen as being trustworthy.
561 Our findings on partner selection criteria depart significantly from Geringer’s
562 (1991) classification of “task-related” and “partner-related” factors. His research
563 suggests that task-related criteria, which refer to the complementarities of resources,
564 are critical to the success of the joint venture. We find that partner’s commitment to
565 the joint venture and related criteria are more important. Factor analysis presented a
566 three factor solution, which conforms to the logic outlined in the model (Fig. 1).
567 While firms in Singapore seek partners who are trustworthy the focus on dominant
568 control borders on distrust of others. No doubt trustworthy partners, as they claim, were
569 difficult to find. But interestingly the level of difficulty encountered was significantly
570 more in China than in India (Table 6). Is Chinese society predisposed to low trust
571 (Fukuyama 1995)? The difficulty in finding trustworthy partners may be attributed to
572 the fact that majority of firms in our sample were SMEs, dependant on personal
573 knowledge rather than impersonal but formal criteria to guide partner selection
574 (Table 3). In the face of limited information whose reliability is questionable, firms
575 would be circumspect and put high value on credibility.
576 The familial system, conflicts and success of IJVs
577 Why is partner commitment such an important issue for the Singapore firms? In a
578 joint venture resource commitments can be agreed and formalized through contracts,
579 and a control mechanism can be put in place for ensuring compliance. However,
580 institutionalized controls, or organizational structures, which are negotiated,
581 elaborated, reproduced and transformed (Gouldner 1973; Lane and Bachmann
582 1998) are inadequate to ensure compliance. Fox (1974) suggests that trust is a
583 discretionary resource and that there will be a whole series of contingent negotiated
584 trade-offs within reciprocal relations, in which diffused obligations are promised and
585 expected and some specified exchanges and outcomes that are contracted and
586 enforced. From a realistic perspective (Reed 2001) trust and control are not two sides
587 of a coin, instead the trade-offs are between commitment and compliance. Controls
588 may force compliance but it does not necessarily lead to commitment.
589 Singapore firms in our sample were focused on finding partners who could be
590 trusted, not just to comply but to contribute social capital to the joint venture. If
591 “guanxi” or connections are important to doing business in China it stands to reason
592 that commitment is important. It is therefore, understandable why these rather than
593 “task-related” factors were singularly important in partner selection. However,
594 having structured the IJV, the Singapore firms reported that the conflicts were low
595 (Table 9) and the joint ventures were not perceived as failures (Table 10).
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596 This is another reason why obtaining commitment of the partner is important.
597 Concern for order or harmony (Hamilton and Biggart 1988) strengthened by
598 reciprocity and personalism is central to the Chinese value system (Redding 1992).
599 When seeking harmony the concern is with behavior and the issues are primarily of
600 “benevolence” and “integrity”. To obtain commitment firms adopt caution and resort
601 to selectivity in identifying partners. Our findings (Table 3) indicate that the
602 Singapore firms depended primarily on direct personal knowledge or that obtained
603 through business associates to identify the prospective partners. Differences are
604 resolved through mutual accommodation with the intentionality of building trust.
605 Once joint ventures are formed they are enduring. This is supported by studies which
606 report that the IJVs in China have been relatively more stable and successful
607 (Beamish 1993; Davidson 1987; Newman 1992;Y a n1998). Our findings that the
608 level of conflicts is low also suggest that the parties to the joint venture want to
609 maintain a harmonious relationship.
610 Fukuyama (1995) asserts that familial system limits people to trusting only those
611 related to them and conversely the system develops distrust for people outside their
612 family and kinship group. This assertion does not square with our findings.
613 Singapore joint ventures’ investments in India, as a percentage of total foreign direct
614 investments in India, also compare favorably with Singapore joint venture invest-
615 ments in China as a percentage of foreign direct investment in China.
616 The assertion that Chinese build networks around family or ethnic groups has
617 been questioned (Li et al. 1999; Boisot and Child 1996). Historically Chinese
618 business in East Asia has prospered not only in States with Chinese majority, such
619 as, Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan, but also in Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand
620 and Philippines, where ethnic Chinese are a minority. In these states the Chinese
621 business forged partnerships with the local business and political elites. What is as
622 significant is that for the Singapore firms it was as easy and as satisfactory to form
623 IJVs in India as in China.
624 The influence of Chinese culture on firm growth and its competitive behavior has
625 deeper implications. Many scholars (Fukuyama 1995; Jenner 1992; Lal 1998) argue
626 that the familial values has prevented the emergence of modern commercial market
627 economy in Peoples Republic of China, and that the lack of social trust, which is
628 engendered by the familial system, will make it difficult for modern corporate form
629 of business organizations to develop in Sinic cultures.
630 As we discovered “guanxi” continues to be an enduring concept in Chinese
631 society. The concept of “guanxi” is more than crony capitalism where reciprocity is
632 implicit and there is also an underlying ethical notion that a party to a relationship
633 (guanxi) should behave uprightly (Yueng and Tung 1996). As Silos (1998, p. 264)
634 argues the Chinese organization is, “a community in which cooperation, respect,
635 trust, loyalty, interdependence, and similar elements of traditional culture form the
636 backbone on which are fleshed out the strategies and techniques for the attainment of
637 goals.” Confucius’ goal was social solidarity, bringing outsiders into the fold of
638 insiders and his ethics creates an environment where reciprocal obligations and the
639 notion of face (avoiding conflicts) develop trust in relationships. Therefore if
640 Singapore firms place high importance on identifying firms in China which possess
641 “guanxi”, it could be interpreted that they realize the importance of becoming
642 insiders.
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643 Conclusions
644 Geringer’s( 1991) typology of partner selection criteria has received considerable
645 attention in the IJV literature. However, our findings did not conform to his
646 typology. In this paper we outline a schema for partner selection (Fig. 1) which has
647 face validity and also conforms to our findings. The typologies differ on two
648 accounts. First, we found that Geringer’s “partner-related” criterion was in fact
649 composed of two independent factors. One set of criteria that reflected cultural
650 distance (national and organizational) and the other set was concerned with
651 commitment and trust. Second, in our sample, cultural distance did not merit high
652 rating and significance in partner selection. In the East Asian context commitment
653 and trust appear to be the most important partner selection criteria.
654 Culture has a determining impact on business systems, particularly, in the context
655 of IJVs. Our findings confirm that Singapore firms seek long-term and harmonious
656 relationships when searching for partners. However, the partner selection process is
657 culturally neutral, guided by commercial interests rather than affinity to a particular
658 culture. The argument that in East Asia connections rather than commercial interests
659 dictate joint venture formation appears to be specious. Singapore firms were as
660 successful in their joint ventures in India as in China. While cultural artifacts
661 influence IJV formation they do not constrain Chinese firms from establishing IJVs
662 outside ethnic boundaries.
663 Results based on a sample of Singapore firms alone impose limitations on
664 generalizing the findings to the Chinese businesses at large. Do the firms from
665 People’s Republic of China follow a similar approach when forming joint ventures
666 in other countries remains a question for future research?
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